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Soweto, Alexandra and Sharpeville were symbols with great resonance in the global
arena of anti-apartheid struggles. Tembisa, Katlehong, Atteridgeville, Wattville - there
are too many to mention - all have had considerable local and national significance.
These locations, townships, ghettoes, are the places to which black people were
consigned during the years of segregation and apartheid; within which the flames of
resistance were ignited during the struggles of the post-1976 era, where homes and
jobs are scarce and lawlessness is rife; and where, today, new local authorities are
attempting to achieve legitimacy and to exact rent and service payments from an
unwilling populace.
Much has been written about the better known amongst these townships. There are
vivid portrayals of moments of crisis and resistance1; there are detailed studies of social
cleavage and cultural interplay2, and there are analytical pieces3. In addition there are
studies of different aspects of social and cultural life in townships - whether these be
focussed upon gangs, liquor brewing, music, sport or other leisure activities4.
This paper seeks, whether boldly or foolishly, to draw together some of the themes
covered in these diverse pieces, and to add new ones - the latter drawn to some extent
from a case study of resistance in Alexandra township in the 1980s. !t addresses itself
to the question: how do we best understand the township rebellions of the nineteen
eighties and their aftermath?
At first this may appear to be a question with a straightforward, common sense set of
answers: Townships were the places where severe oppression and poverty were
experienced on a racial and class basis. This in itself surely seems sufficient to explain
the emergence of revolt in the mid 1980s. What a good analysis requires, therefore,
is the documenting of the forms of oppression experienced by township residents; from
this documentation will arise an understanding of why they rebelled.
However the flaw in this type of explanation - as a vast literature on the explanation of
social movements and collective action will confirm - is that it operates by reference to
the immutable laws of history (repression must inevitably lead to resistance); or to
simple economic determinism (deprivation must lead to resistance). A more
sophisticated form of determinism is used by "crisis" theorists, who suggest that the
"deep crisis" of the South African economy of the mid-eighties underpinned the
revolutionary upsurges of the time. But are such determinisms sufficient? Those who
1
have studied individual townships, or who have developed a comparative
understanding suggest that they may not be. Not all oppressed populations rebel; and
not all rebellious populations are notably and consistently oppressed. The link between
oppression and resistance, therefore, is something that needs exploring in and of itself;
while the causes of rebellion are themselves not reducible to the presence of suffering
in the rebellious population. Furthermore, the notion of "crisis" runs the risk of tautology,
as do many explanations of social movements, for it is never clear whether rebellion is
the cause or the symptom of the crisis.
The style and content of rebellion too cannot be explained simply by reference to the
style and form taken by oppression and suffering. While South African townships were
at base the places where the black working class was housed cheaply and controlled
easily, rebellion therein, during the mid-eighties, certainly did not take an entirely
"proletarian" form. The rebels of the 1980s rose up in a revolutionary mode which was
nationalistic, intra-generational, mutinous, and insurrectionist and only sporadically
directed at capital per se. The rebellions had powerful strands of anti-modernism and
anti-liberalism within them, and were directed at government rather than accumulation.
This paper is an examination of the township as a social, cultural, political, economic
and spatial environment, with special reference to its capacity to produce the resistant
classes who emerged in the 1980s and whose world views continue to shape politics
in South Africa today. It locates itself neither within the tradition of social history that
has documented township life so richly, although it depends upon the literature
emerging from that tradition for much of its material; nor within the tradition of urban and
regional studies that has explored the geographical and spatial dimensions of the
creation of townships, although this, too, provides a vital basis for the essay. The paper
is located within the theories of social movements and collective action that have
become increasingly sophisticated in other settings, but have not been used to a great
extent in the South African situation.5
The paper draws on the classical concepts such as those of class, status (in which a
classicist might include race) and power- it has been, in much work on collective action,
the rich combination of Marxist and Weberian thinking that has often borne fruit. The
paper also refers to more contemporary concerns with culture, discourse and meaning.6
The phenomenon of the township is not explicable only by reference to the determining
power of race, class or suffering; but it is also not simply a repository of an infinite
number of discourses - a structural pattern exists, a pattern which replicates itself, with
local variations, across the South African social order more broadly.
The first requirement of the analysis is to ask what the nature of the rebellions was -
what is it, more precisely, that needs explanation? What were the chief patterns taken
by the township revolts of the 1980s?7 The case of Alexandra township, while unique,
embodies some of the characteristics of the resistance of the 80s more broadly, and a
closer examination of its main features is instructive.8
First, in Alexandra as elsewhere, young people - the "youth" - not only sustained and
led the revolt; they projected a transformative moral vision which shaped the discourses
of the township in general, and which challenged the moral authority of older residents
in particular. This moral vision was almost millenarian in its projection of a future
township without crime, decay or alcohol; but it also contained within it the frightening
certainties of its own correctness which drove many of the youth into authoritarian acts.
The youth also identified themselves as a separate stratum, with clear political and
moral differences from their elders. A powerful age cleavage became intensely
politicised and shot through with contestations of belief.
Second, those who rebelled heeded the ANC's call for "ungovernability" - and during
the revolt the state lost what little legitimacy it had historically held in the township (and
it had held at least some) and came to be treated as an occupying force, whose stance
was defensive and whose tactics became military. Local authorities were rejected, and
an alternative political, social and moral order was posed - reminiscent of the urban
revolutionary upsurges in the Spanish Civil War.
Third, the revolt included acts of violence and brutality by the revolutionaries as well as
the state. These included arbitrary shooting to the death, and violent vigilantism on the
part of local or national government forces; and the mobilisation of youths in gang-like
groupings in which maleness and militancy ran together, and who on occasion resorted
to extremes such as the burning of people named as spies, or the violent punishment
of wrongdoers.
Fourth, the rebellion took a spatial form, with the transformative vision of the youth
being mapped onto the streets, parks, schools, yards and blocks of Alexandra. The
borders of the township, there to keep black people in, became barricades designed to
keep white people p_yi.
What is striking in the Alexandra case is that a class or stratum of people was produced
with a revolutionary spirit. Carter, in his perceptive study of the revolt, uses the idea of
"counter hegemony" to explain the contestation - but this seems a little bland for a
situation in which a semi-permanent legal and moral vacuum came into place, where
a sense of moral righteousness slid, at times, into a-morality, and where many aspects
of the world of the residents was, to use Christopher Hill's phrase, "turned upside
down". (In Cape Town in one school boycott, to give but one of many examples,
relationships between older staff and younger students were "consistently and
completely overturned").9
And in all of these matters Alexandra was not unique. Of course there were immense
variations in the pattern taken by revolt in different regions and townships. But there
is no doubt that generalisable features drawn from a similar repertoire were present in
a range of places in the mid 80s: they included the prominence of militant youth; the
use of school and rent boycotts; the rise and consolidation of street committees; the
development of peoples' courts; the prominence of new, charismatic leaders; the
development of opportunistic criminal sub-cultures; the articulation of a range of semi-
millenarian ideologies; the use of state violence; necklacings; and a rejection of local
authorities.
The simultaneous presence of most of these features in a variety of entirely different
regions of the country cannot have been simply the product of the political call by the
ANC for ungovernability. The paper argues that the roots of the township rebellions of
the eighties lie, rather, in the nature of the political, economic and cultural systems,
variously called "locations" or "townships", from which the revolts emerged. It is with
these "roots", rather than with the political behaviour of organised movements
themselves that this paper is concerned.
The crux of the argument is that the explanation for the revolts of the mid-eighties lies
in the changing configurations of race, class and authority within townships over time.
One major and pivotal change in these relationships is identified, and the paper
operates through the use of ideal-typical constructions of the nature of townships in the
two crucial eras concerned - namely that which could broadly be described as the era
of "welfare paternalism"; and the subsequent, equally broadly characterised era of
"racial modernism" which succeeded it. Each era is defined through a description of its
main features.
Both eras were racist, both were exploitative, both engendered class and community
struggles - but they differed from one another in important ways. The paper suggests
that in the move from the one era to the other lies the explanation for the move from
"governability" to "ungovernability".
These two eras do not pivot neatly around the change of government from the United
Party to the National Party in 1948, as might first appear to be the case. The complete
transition from the one era to the other occurs far later, and may be attributed to the
consolidation of what some have called "high apartheid" in the late 1960s and the
1970s.
a) The era of "Welfare Paternalism" 1910-1948
Townships were first created by the visionaries of urban racial paternalism, the self-
appointed guardians of the "native" in town. By definition a township was a segregated
area, designated for residential use by those who were not white. Townships were
dormitories. They had little productive base of their own. In a coincidence of racial
symbolism and notions of caste-like separatism hinging around purity, it was sometimes
said to be necessary to build such townships because of the dire problems of health
and disease caused by inner city slum growth - the "sanitation syndrome" as it has been
called10. But it was not always possible for the paternalists of these decades to perfect
a segregationist ideal. People of all colours and backgrounds thrust their way into
places where they were not supposed to be, creating communities which lacked the
racial and ethnic uniformity of later years. But the tendency over time was for black
living areas to become more uniform and more clearly segregated.
What made townships "governable" in this era? Again, abstracting from history and
using ideal-typical and synchronic analysis, the following major features may be
identified:
The clearly spatial dimension of control and design in the construction of townships is
one common feature. A variety of spatial forms characterised the era of welfare
paternalism - ranging from the early city slumyards; the first state constructed locations
- which were larger, segregated, but not always very distant; and the first squatter-built
shantytowns; through to the model modern township11.
These spatial forms evolved in ways to suit paternalism and eventually to epitomise
modernism. The early slumyards were soon cleared - they were spatially too complex,
consisting of crowded homes and rooms arranged around a central yard; they
developed family forms and subcultures which were unattractive to the middle classes,
they presented "health" problems, and they were too near white areas. They were also
racially mixed, and presented few possibilities for systematic administration.12 When
the first locations were declared, by contrast, these were spatially more organised,
further from town, and well ordered in ways that permitted both administration and
control.13 Whereas the slumyards had been the basis upon which a range of family
forms were constructed, for example, the locations were designed to accommodate,
and perhaps create, more "ordered" nuclear families housed in separate houses,
planned in a more ordered fashion along straight or gently curving streets.14 The
average location was provided with the minimum necessities of a social and cultural life.
Brakpan, for example, had a venereal clinic, location hall, police station and cells, ten
shops, the American Board, Swedish Mission and AME churches, rough playing fields,
a bucket sewerage system and a Panoptikon-like system of control, with:
a large square in the middle of the location at the meeting point of all
roads which cut across the location diagonally. This square commanded
a view of the location in all directions from which location officials could
survey the entire area.15
In addition locations often had watch posts outside to control entry and exit, while later
many locations were actually fenced.16
As urbanisation increased, location life lost its orderliness. Tenants and sub-tenants
crowded into them. Shanties emerged, clustered in squatter settlements; the latter were
unruly and ungovernable, with their own distinctive social movements attached, and
were not readily tolerated. But most squatters of the first period of mass urbanisation -
the 1940s - began to be rehoused in "orderly" fashion soon after the War.17. At the
same time newer township forms, much further from the cities, much more
"scientifically" planned, and much bigger, were built to replace the locations. At the
height of "racial modernism" complete and drastic urban segregation was achieved in
most areas. Today even the smallest town presents an extraordinary visual shock to the
traveller, as first the "town" is observed, with its mixture of building forms, its electric
lights, its trees and its loosely ordered street structure; and then the umbilically
attached satellite "township" comes into view, with its smoky pall, its barrenness, and
its regulated form. These architectural and spatial decisions attempted to ensure that
control could be exerted, and that black life would remain isolated.
Spatial factors on their own are not sufficient to explain or understand the nature of the
township, however.18 If they were, then we would find it difficult to distinguish, for
example, the older locations from the newer townships, as both were poor, segregated
and regimented.19 A second major feature of this era was the paternalistic nature of
government. This paternalism depended upon three key elements: the presence of a
very small but highly significant stratum of township residents who could own land, or
who had other means of establishing themselves as an elite;20 the systems and
ideologies which shaped government practice; and the part played by liberals.
A small number of townships were originally built to include an urban landholding elite.
Although this philosophy eventually gave way to the idea that no blacks should be
permitted so great a stake in the city - so that the later "locations" were all based upon
rentals - the presence and persistence of a stratum of landholding urban-dwellers
should not be ignored. Famous freehold townships included Alexandra, and
Sophiatown. in Alexandra as elsewhere, a standholding elite emerged soon after the
township was established in 1912. Many of the standholders came to town with
resources accumulated on the land: some through vigorous peasant farming, with which
some retained some connection; others through sharecropping, which for many came
to an end in the first two decades of the century; and others through small business
activities.21 However not every standholder started off well. Many of those who came
to town did so from a position of weakness stemming from the removal of landholding
rights in the rural areas as a result of the 1913 Land Act,22 rather than strength. But
stands were cheap and some quite modestly paid urban workers managed to buy them
in the first decades of the century.23 But even standholders with lowlier origins became,
by the very fact of their having bought stands, part of a new urban elite, apart from
those who flooded into the cities in later years when no more land was available for
black purchase.
Locations each boasted a small social and cultural elite as well.24 These were people
who had better jobs and were better educated than most. Some saw themselves as a
sort of urban aristocracy - a "civilised11, "educated", "respectable"25 group of people, who
lived within a cultural world which included such activities as philharmonic choirs,
playing tennis, holding tea parties; and organising charitable activities.26 They sought
home ownership and participation in local government. Some of them were a sort of
super-elite - they were "the names",27 the
very cream of the elite. As in the case of any old aristocracy, these few
did not need to show their status, for people knew their names.28
Because the elite had a stake in the city, they provided a moral, economic and political
basis for the patemalistic order of the time.29 Their good mission education, for
example, provided them with cultural resources which they used to effect. But the elite
was bound up with the other location dwellers in numerous ways. Standholders, for
example, depended upon and nurtured their kin; they cultivated their own capacity as
city patrons by offering access to living space and to important networks to their
siblings, cousins, children and home folk. In many townships they began before long
to become landlords in a more directly commercial sense, subletting tiny portions of
their already small plots to newly arrived migrants who were not all kin. The elite
provided a social and cultural route deep into the community.
A further feature of this era was the way in which government itself perceived and
constructed its role. The system of township administration itself was paternalistic
rather than strictly bureaucratic. In Soweto each sub-township had its own
Superintendent, as well as one or more assistant Superintendents - all white state or
municipal appointees. Administrators were expected to steep themselves in the
township, and, according to one memoir, govern by "exception" rather than by strict
reference to the rules, a system he calls "English" by contrast to the "Afrikaans" system
of hierarchical rule-dependence30 (although whether he is referring to administrative
flexibility or straight corruption31 is unclear.) In Brakpan, township administration was
hands-on:
The location superintendent's house was constructed within the location
grounds, amidst a cluster of location offices in order to facilitate close
contact between this official and the location inhabitants.32
Such closeness of government, which embraced a consideration of the "arts" of
government, was commonplace.33
This system was then meshed well with the established standholding and cultural elite -
whose systems of patronage lent stability - perhaps sometimes even a weak form of
legitimacy - to the townships. Township administrators were wise enough to keep their
connections with the elite well oiled - and to this end, to the social and economic and
social elite was added a small, but equally significant, political elite. This occurred
mainly through the establishment of Advisory Boards, which, according to Sapire, would
"divert...petty bourgeois political frustrations into safer channels" and provide for "some
development in the art of self-government".34 Advisory Boards were composed of
blacks drawn mainly from the elite, whose overt function was no more than their name
suggested. But their latent function was similar to that of the elite more generally - they
acted as patrons, held networks together, and dispensed favours.
Alongside the system of administration went, in many places, a whole range of formal
and informal arrangements between township residents and institutions on the one
hand, and white liberal individuals and institutions on the other.35 Liberals acted as
patrons, intermediaries, dispensers of charity, and facilitators of a whole range of
cultural and social institutions. Liberals were active in matters of health,36 childcare,37
legal aid, education, sport, music, charity, social work, and many others.38 Through
philanthropy here, as elsewhere in early capitalism, the formation of important social
institutions was "policed".39 Liberals displayed an increasing awareness over time of the
pitfalls of paternalism. Ralph Bunche, in his travels through the South Africa of this
period recounts a hilarious interview with a Dr Sachs, who believed that paternalism
was reinforced by maternalism - for he held that unregulated breast feeding made "the
native" believe that the government should be benevolent.40
The effects of liberalism upon the construction of township life were complex.
Numerous social and cultural institutions were established which undoubtedly improved
the quality of life of many township residents.41 But it was not just that liberal
interventions were born of a paternalistic motive. They actually helped institutionalise
paternalism by boosting the patronage networks which both the systems of
standholding and those of Advisory Boards had already created - helping to nurture the
development of "big men" such as those in the fields of soccer, boxing and music, for
example.42
Alexandra was an unusual township because of its non-adoption by a local white
municipality such as Johannesburg, and therefore its status as "Nobody's Baby".43 But
it, too, experienced a form of paternalism. It was run by a "Health Committee" (the very
name a manifestation of the connection between townships and disease in the mind of
the time) comprising eminent, and often liberal and left-wing, whites. The township
produced a modest elite whose administrative, cultural and even political role was
nevertheless significant; and in the networks established in the township between white
liberals on the one hand, and township residents on the other, a number of voluntary
associations were formed, just as elsewhere in colonial systems. Health, childcare,
sport, youth, music, and many other spheres, all generated clubs and societies, each
with its own bureaucratic habits and status symbols. Liberal connections through
charity operated as well.
In this and other locations, the role of the church was complex and crucial. Not only did
mission education create and reproduce the elite; church ideology provided a core
around which the syncretic culture of the "respectables" shaped their worlds,44 and the
poor defined their varying degrees of acceptance of, or resentment against, their
poverty.
Compared with later times, the bureaucratic imposition by the administrative system
upon township residents was not overwhelming - and in many cases the reception of
bureaucracy by inhabitants was not hostile, a symptom, perhaps of the presence of
patron-client networks which provided a way through it. The leviathan had not yet been
born. The pass laws were in place, but they could always be fiddled, and members of
the elite made sure they were, whether formally or informally, treated leniently.45
But paternalism was not the only feature of governance in this period. It was
accompanied by an element of welfarism which ensured that the township poor could
survive - if only just. Basically, local government provided the means to finance
townships, through the provision of a subsidy from central city councils; through
providing beerhalls whose entire profit was channelled into township costs; and later
8
through the operation of a levy on employers. Rents were thus kept stable and low; and
facilities of a basic sort were available.
The importance of this modest welfarism should not be underestimated. Townships
were at the heart of one of the major contradictions in the South African social order of
the time - the contradiction between the need to keep wages low, and the need to make
sure the reproduction costs of the working class were covered, while social stability was
maintained. The early literature on this subject suggests that the state sought to resolve
this contradiction through the system of keeping the Reserves as places where the old,
sick and unemployed remained, reducing the costs of "reproducing" a single worker in
the city to a bare minimum.46 But others soon pointed to the fact that this displacement
of reproduction costs only took place for some - every government in South Africa this
century has had to accept and confront the reality of an urban working class in its full
sense of the term.47 The question then became - how could this low-paid working class
survive in town? The answer of paternalistic welfarism was: through cross-
subsidisation. The later answer of the Nationalists was to be entirely different.
In spite of the presence of identifiable social and economic groupings within townships,
it should be noted that What stratification did exist was always softened by other social
and economic forces - such as age, networks, ethnic contacts, patronage and rapid
mobility. Classes were always reconstructed in syncretic ways that embraced rural
social identities as well as newer urban ones. Thus township life until the 1940s was not
stratified in the rigid sense.48 The standholding elite's networks of patronage rendered
cultural and community bonds quite strong; while the very poor coming into the
township were often accommodated. In patterns reminiscent of those characterising
the English working class of the late 19th century, modernist and Christian values were
uppermost in many situations - families were constructed and sustained in difficult
economic circumstances; parents wished their children to be schooled; sought
respectability through the kinds of jobs and homes they created; and aspired to social
and economic mobility. Independent women held homes together through liquor
brewing and washing, but were driven by strong visions of their own capacity to bind
communities together.49 However it should be noted that these "softened" stratifications
were still of vital importance to the governance of the system, and that the National
Party was later to destroy them at considerable cost.
The politics of this period reflected these features of class, status and governance;
politics tended to be associational and bureaucratised, with clearly defined roles for elite
leaders, and sometimes an embracing of the paternalistic idea that associations
amongst blacks could and would lead to communication with the state. The politics of
influence prevailed. Perhaps because of the presence of patronage and networks, the
upper strata had little or no capacity to make serious representative connections with
those at the lower levels50 - you do not represent those who are your clients. The
political language of the time more often took the form of constructing pleas rather than
making demands, for example. One analyst writes of the "accommodationist character
of popular culture and consciousness". The strength of the early and relatively
moderate forms of nationalism in this period was a corollary of the strength of the
evolving family and community structures in townships.
But the efficiency of townships also depended upon the effective working of the physical
connection between white and black areas. One of the more radical forms taken by
resistance in this era - the transport boycott - is a direct reflection of the spatial form of
control.51 What is interesting, however, is that although the spatial form did underpin
one type of collective action in this period, the resistance reflected the connections
between town and township, rather than the inner complexities of the township itself,
as was to occur later.
Paternalism constructed its own version of black citizenship. While no blacks were full
citizens, the elite saw themselves as potential or actual citizens. For example they
associated home ownership with citizenship;52 they were not "foreigners"; they had
some land rights; they were accorded some dignity; and they had an acknowledged
political role to play. Because their connections with their own co-residents were based
so clearly upon patronage, these attributes of citizenship played an important part in the
township as a whole, distinguishing the conception of citizenship in this period from that
to be constructed under apartheid.
The townships of the time did breed a variety of sub-cultural forms. To observers of the
time youth subcultures - mild by today's standards - stood out as dangerously
alternative.53 Gangsterism, gambling, alcoholism, truancy, crime, were all thought of as
threatening to the social fabric. New restrictions on visitors and residents were
introduced in locations in the thirties to attempt to curb the moral degeneration of
locations.54 But perceptions of the threat reflected more upon the relatively intact nature
of the "social fabric" than upon the capacity of sub-cultures to erode it. A feature of the
period was, in fact, the presence of a sense of the role of law - to many a respected and
often used system to protect rights and enforce the performance of duties. In Brakpan,
the "Location Vigilance Association", for example, was an organisation of the township's
elite which "systematically challenged the validity of (location) regulations in the
courts".55 Perhaps this was linked to the relatively strong ideas of morality amongst the
population, as well as to the perceived manageability of the bureaucracy.
What did race mean to township dwellers in this era? Because of the complexity of the
construction of hegemony, race did not always, it may be suggested, act as the single
or even primary source of township identity. The paternalistic order gave rise to a range
of types of identity around which relationships of power and authority were built,
including that of the elite, the elders, the schoolgoers, the "respectables", the
standholders, "law abiding natives",56 "big" men, and independent women. It may be
that, deriving their ideas from rural racial ideologies whites continued to be
conceptualised by blacks as a differentiated rather than a single category57 - there were
Afrikaners, Jews, English-speakers and "friends of the native" - and that this complexity
could have at times alleviated the harshness of the objectively racial nature of the state
(particularly in comparison to the racial monoliths of later years), especially in a context
where paternalism anyway played a mediating role.
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Given the hegemony of paternalistic notions (or perhaps as evidence of that hegemony
- it is difficult to avoid tautology at times) it is not surprising that ideologies of resistance
in this period frequently did not reject liberalism, but sought to modify it to remove its
more paternalistic elements - to "modernise" it - or redefine it, or soften it if it became
too harsh.58 The kinds of rebellion this paper is trying to explain - uprisings in which the
entire moral order was questioned, reversed, destroyed - were not a feature, broadly
speaking, of this period. Instead, paternalism provided a way of talking about and
coping with poverty that simultaneously addressed the issue and reinforced the position
of the elite; and in many cases of protest the elite itself, even when relatively distanced
from its poorer co-residents, would eventually respond to popular militancy and channel
it in non-destructive directions.
This portrayal of a system which was governable - in which hegemony actually existed -
needs some qualification. In the late 1930s and the 1940s, urbanisation increased so
rapidly that it called into question the stability of township life - not to mention the careful
balancing of the books relating to the costs of reproduction. Huge numbers of
"squatters" flooded the towns, and the "amarespectables" - those who prided
themselves on their urban sophistication - made sure they distanced themselves from
those with less money, less status, fewer contacts and less class. Squatter camps
emerged where, much like today, populist and syncretic ideologies prevailed over the
more clearly nationalist and urban ideas of the older strata. Gang and criminal
subcultures took on a more threatening form, and something akin to class warfare was
waged in the townships of the time. It was the presence of the squatters, in part, that
created the conditions for the National Party victory in 1948. Until that happened the
paternalists were forced to seek ways of accepting the squatters into the urban order.
b) Paternalism under siege: 1948-1968
The change of government in 1948 ushered in a era of 20 years during which welfare
paternalism was modified and made harsher, but not completely eradicated. The
beginnings of nationalist "ultramodernisation" were to be found in this period - but true
"racial modernism", it is suggested here, only emerged in the 1970s.
The National Party spent the first years of its rule building upon the systems set by
paternalism. The governability of townships survived this period - indeed perhaps this
is why some older residents of townships such as Soweto hanker after the "calmer"
1960s, as opposed to the turbulent eighties and nineties.59 Observers of Soweto in the
late 1950s noted that the relationship between African township residents and municipal
employees was a relatively good one: "In general this relationship appears to be
excellent, the superintendents of the location and their assistants having the trust of the
residents and being held in high esteem".60
Welfarist and paternalist elements remained in the first phase of apartheid. For example
the costs of providing housing were financed through levying employers of African
labour, and through loans from central and local government. Table A gives an idea
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of the scale and proportions involved in this ongoing practice, and of the financial
stability of this period.
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Table A61:
City of Johannesburg: Extracts from Native Revenue Account
(a) Housing
Year
ended 30
June
1920
1930
1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
Cumulative
Capital
Expenditure
(R)
253,672
1,050,746
3,141,686
10,840,814
15,491,136
40,907,214
53,438,569
(b) Bantu Beer
1955
1960
1965
Total since 1938
No. of
Houses
Built(Cum.
Total)
77
2,625
8,700
16,577
18,346
51,914
62,475
No, of
Hostel
Beds
available(Cum.
Total)
1,688
3,400
6,912
10,538
10,538 1
24,310 3
Rents(Net)
(R)
—
108,145
337,560
753,613
,142,952
,106,213
26,871 3,889,028
Sales
(R)
1,646,466
2,691,090
5,204,225
40:355,781
1
2
18
Deficit of
Native
Revenue
A/c debited
to rates
(R)
—^
35,153
24,863 Cr
483,916
341,716
686,250
474,520
Profit
(R)
854,312
,299,768
,223,296
,718,322
(c) Annual Contributions by Employers to
I960
1965
(i)
Bantu Services
Levy Fund
(R)
1,230,280
1,400,642
1,711,527
Total since 1953 __ — 17,533,942
(ii)
Bantu Transport
Services Levy
(R)
298,292
647,606
605,877
6,16L182
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Advisory boards remained for a number of years, in spite of attempts to replace them
with new "Urban Bantu Councils". The full closing down of the Advisory Boards only
really took place in the 1970s. Local City Councils continued to run townships through,
for example, as the case of Soweto, their non-European Affairs Department, which by
the mid 1960s had a staff of 700, a budget of R1m per annum and provided and
maintained 3 stadia, 86 sportsfields, a sheltered employment workshop, a Vocational
training school, youth employment centres, recreational centres, a Technical high
school, and assistance to the aged, disabled and destitute. All of this continued to be
financed, in part, from the sales of "Bantu beer", and, from 1962 onwards, "European
liquor",62 as well as through employer levies and subsidies from the City Councils
themselves (meaning, presumably, that some redistribution was taking place within
cities). Rent subsidies were granted to those eligible.63
However the seeds of the destruction of paternalism were to be found even in this early
period - even the first decade of National Party rule featured a more vigorous and
bureaucratised modernism than that which had characterised the earlier period. Where
it could, for example ip Alexandra and "Diepmeadow", the state took over direct control
of township government early on. Alexandra was placed under the infamous Peri-Urban
Health Board in 1958, while from their inception the townships of Diepkloof and
Meadowlands were state administered. It is no coincidence that these two areas of the
Reef were linked - for when Alexandra was "cleaned up" in the early 1960s, and
masses of people removed from it, it was in Diepkloof and Meadowlands that they were
resettled.
The new government still required and desired separate places where the urban black
working class was to be housed; urban dwellers had to be acknowledged and included
if capitalism more broadly was to survive. Like those in the governments before them,
the "pragmatists" within the National Party made certain that ideas of complete removal
of the black urban population (which had in fact been mooted by more purist elements)
were never implemented. But gradually the status of townships within the moral,
political and cultural order established earlier under paternalism began to change.
The Nationalists attempted to solve the housing crisis which had emerged in the 1940s
through the building of more townships or locations.64 These were to be more clearly
segregated and distanced from cities, and more perfectly and "scientifically" planned65 -
"cleaned up", to use the phrase applied to Alexandra. The element of surveillance and
spatial control was extended far beyond that which had existed previously. "By the late
1950s, Benoni, Springs and Germiston could boast large, "scientifically" planned
townships quarantined within "buffer zones" on the outer fringes of the towns".66 Indeed
many locations were removed to the new outer townships, in state-conducted removals
that were harsh and brutal to many, and added to the population of former squatters
housed there. By 1962, for example, there had been 44,196 removals from Alexandra
alone67 - although the township was never in fact fully destroyed.
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"Efficient" housing provision held sway over the disorderliness that had come to
characterise the locations. And in a new twist which added complexity to the
consolidation of the modernist vision, these townships were designed to be internally
segregated on ethnic lines.
Then, there was the rise to prominence of a far more bureaucratic form of governance.
A proliferation of rules, laws and regulations indicated that government by bureaucratic
decree - issued from the central state rather than local government, in an attempt to
control at a distance the operation of local government - was to be the order of the day.
96 Acts which affected the administration of urban Africans were passed between 1945
and 1965.68 Influx control and pass laws were more strictly enforced. Permission to
reside in the city became ever more difficult to secure. By the mid sixties, both man and
wife had to qualify for urban domicile if they were to remain in town - and wives who
didn't qualify in their own right were sent back to the rural areas.
The extraordinary expansion and overburdening imposition of a cruel and Kafkaesque
bureaucracy - whose operation we understand very little, and tend to study even less -
was a feature of the period. Officials had to
master the numerous regulations issued by virtue of the enabling clauses
contained in these Acts and the directives issued by the Department of
Bantu Administration and Development in terms of the regulations, a
burden of onerous dimensions to the administrator, and crippling to those
administered.69
A difference in administrative "tone" also emerged. Ellen Hellman noted in the mid 60s
an "increasing stringency and rigidity" in the application of the law:
Formerly one could also see the harshness of the law being tempered by
the exercise of official discretion. Now, with the reins ever more tightly
held by Pretoria, the local Department is left with very little discretion of
its own to exercise.
Thus even in this early phase, the experience of the citizens was radically altered:
The human tragedies caused by these regulations can be seen and
heard daily at the superintendents' offices in Soweto and at the central
office of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department.70
The move from "location" to "township" also affected the ways in which the township
elite was incorporated into governance. In one case, for example, the Advisory Board
changed, upon the move, from "a civic institution of township notables to a political
pressure group of township "bosses", and, instead of a channel of communication, it
became a barrier between administration and administered".71 The township
administrator in this case - a paragon of paternalism in the years of the "location" - had
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"retreated behind an army of European and African officials".72 And the old elite itself
found that its patron-client networks were broken with the move from location to
township; and that its sources of income (landlordism in many cases) were gone. A
new elite began to take its place:
one by one, the bearers of the big names were dropping out of business
life. They went bankrupt; they had to "sell" their dying shops; they just
could not adjust to the change. ...And so the veterans had to watch
another wave of newcomers settle down,...These were the doctors and
lawyers, the public servants, the graduates and the trained....They
introduced entirely new social customs and manners, and they now set
the tone of the social life of the community.73
No political place was offered, however, to this new elite.
c) The era of high "racial modernism": 1968-1986
The second phase of National Party rule - that which began in the late 1960s - saw a
more complete overturning of the old system of welfare paternalism.
First, the frustration of the central government with municipal rule ended in 1972-3,
when control of African townships was finally removed from local authorities. 22 Bantu
Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs) were set up over the next few years. The state
could at last directly govern the townships.
At a stroke, the economic basis of welfare paternalism was removed, for these boards
were expected to be self-financing. The services and infrastructure previously
subsidised by local authorities were now to be fully paid for by township residents
themselves - mainly through rents, but also through the continuing sales of beer and
"European liquor", and a variety of levies. The contrast between Table A and Table B
illustrates the extraordinary shift that had taken place in the fourteen years between
1965 and 1979; whereas in 1965 total income from rents was estimated at R3.8m, by
1978-9 it was projected to reach as much as R30m.
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Table B74:
West Rand Administration Board budget, 1978-9:
Planned income:
Housing rental: R30 151 400
Levies 10 777 000
Sale of beer 16 300 000
Sale of liquor 16 800 000
Sport etc 525 000
General income 660 000
TOTAL 75 200 000
Further evidence of this is that whereas in 1970-1 the Native Revenue Account had
shown an aggregate R30m surplus, by 1982-3 the deficit in this account was R32.1m.7S
While a variety of factors were at play in this shift, including a decline in the
consumption of the profitable "Bantu Beer", it was the removal of two important
"welfarist" components of the financing system - the freezing in 1977 of the levy on
employers and the removal of the subsidy by the City and Town Councils - that
rendered local administration unprofitable. Not unnaturally the first line of attack upon
this deficit was the increase in rents, which doubled between 1970 and 1977, but this
was insufficient, Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs) had been placed in an
untenable situation by the way in which government had removed the welfare elements
in township financing without offering any clear alternative other than the increase in
rents. Their pre-Thatcherite Thatcherism was to prove lethal to the stability of black
governance.
With the passing of time, the role of the bureaucracy became even more imposing and
alienating. It became a huge leviathan, run by people who spoke Afrikaans - less
familiar to blacks in many areas - rather than English; who resorted to the rule book
when insecure about their inexperience in administering; and whose requirements
became increasingly burdensome and unjust over time. The areas they controlled
became increasingly personal, extending not only into the family, but into the home, the
place of work, transport, the body, and the mind. Of course the over-administration of
townships by decree encouraged a disrespect for the law itself - the excessive legalism
of apartheid corrupted the law, rather than protected it.
This era also entailed the transformation of township residents from a moderately
stratified population (with all the qualifications mentioned above) with varying
relationships to land, into a mass of tenants, with uniform relationships to the land and
the state76 (tempered, perhaps, by their different types of housing - "housing classes"
appear to have been created in some areas). But overall, using spatial and architectural
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means, the new social engineers of modernity devised ways of bludgeoning away
incipient or past differences of economic status and blurring previously relatively
clearcut class differences - the state could allocate a home to a doctor next door to that
of a streetsweeper, with nothing to distinguish them.
A general feature of National Party rule, particularly in the later period, was its attitude
towards the black elite, and the patronage structures that were in place. Some might
think of the national party as a parody of post-colonialism - with its pseudo
"independence" for black homelands, for example. But in one respect they were far
from taking even a mockery of the route of many post-colonial governments, which was
to actually reinforce the existing elite; they took a completely different path - to destroy
and dispossess it. The new order left little avenue for elite incorporation.
Thus all standholders were dispossessed in this period, either in situ or through removal
to other areas. The epic removals of landowners from Sophiatown, District Six and
many others have found expression in literary and poetic form - and the passion with
which this loss is mourned perhaps suggests that more than landholdings were being
lost; these removals were bound up with the forced downward mobility of the black
location elite, including standholders -whose position, I have argued above, was crucial
to the relative stability of the older paternalistic order.
The Nationalists were revolutionaries in this respect. They undermined many other
features of the older order. They imposed new restrictions upon African trade,
accumulation and mobility. They destroyed the educational and religious channels
through which elite status had been sought and obtained. For example, the new
system of schooling - Bantu Education - was inimical to the older paternalistic ways, for
it expanded the access to low quality schools of the mass of township dwellers while
undercutting the process of the production of an elite through the closing down of all the
better mission schools.
The capacity of older people to exercise authority over younger had already been
weakened by the normal processes of urbanisation and the modernisation of the family.
Now it was further undermined through the imposition of grossly humiliating restrictions
upon adults. Seared upon the minds of the young were the experiences of seeing
parents standing in queues for hours, even days, only to be told to "come back next
week", with more unobtainable documents; or observing the fear and panic in the eyes
of their elders when they were vulnerable to. pass restrictions. High apartheid made new
inroads into the selfhood and dignity of the older generation, whose expectations of
paternalistic behaviour were no longer to be met. The rise of the new ideology of Black
Consciousness, with its very emphasis on selfhood and dignity, was in part a response
to this.
The Nationalists also undercut the old elite by removing the Advisory Boards and
replacing them with a succession of new systems of local representation. This idea was
first promulgated as early as 1961; but it took until 1977 for all 24 new "Urban Bantu
Councils" (also known as "Useless Boys Clubs") to be put in place. However the
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attitude of the state towards these councils was far less paternalistic than had been the
case with the Advisory Boards. In many areas, the weakened black elite could not
muster even a basic legitimacy for them. As a result, what modest interest there had
been amongst township populations in their own governance declined significantly; by
1974, only 14% of the Soweto (registered) electorate voted in UBC elections, a decline
of over 50% in eight years. When a few years later the government attempted to revive
black participation in township government through the creation of "Community
Councils", they were no more successful,77 and their final attempt at achieving the
legitimacy of black local government - through the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 -
was even more of a failure, leading directly, some would argue, into the revolts of the
mid eighties.78 By 1985 only three Black Town Councils were operating.
Tenants too were transformed - for their landlord now became the highly bureaucratic,
modernising and racist state rather than the standholder or the paternalistic City
Council, placing them in an entirely different structural position within the social order.
If the lines of oppression do at least in part dictate the lines of resistance, then this new
situation put township residents into a potentially directly oppositional relationship with
the state itself, with no intermediaries to buffer it.
The Nationalists also issued an ideological onslaught upon the idea of "the urban",
turning it into an empty, hollow category with negative connotations. This distinguished
it from the more positive connotations given to it under paternalism, which contained the
idea of some sort of "evolution" away from tribalism and the rural, towards
detribalisation and the urban. This removal of an important element of the old discourse
added to the emptiness of what the Nationalists were offering.
In the case of areas that were not removed (Alexandra, at first, being one), these
transformations occurred in situ. This probably made things worse for the residents, for
layers of sedimented memory of a different past, reinforced by the architectural and
spatial features of the township, were left in place - ready to be activated by new
ideologies and turned into powerful mythical forces when social mobilisation began.
In the case of the many areas that were removed, the operation of memory took a
different form: removals to the newly created townships on the peripheries of white
cities entailed the removals of memories as well - and the new areas were imbued with
ideas about a number of pasts. New suburbs - Diepkloof, Meadowlands, carried with
them the bitterness of dispossession. But the censorship and control of ideas forced
memories in all of these areas into a forbidden and secret underworld, where again they
remained until popular intellectuals sought to mobilise them.
A further transformation that occurred under high apartheid was the re-engineering of
the family. All new township houses were designed on the assumption that they would
be occupied by something approximating a nuclear family. Furthermore, the way the
laws of residence worked meant that family stability depended upon job stability and
gender. Far from consolidating the family, these regulations worked to fragment it - to
create the conditions for bitter and harmful disputes over the matter of home-occupancy
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between kin; to force women into marriages of convenience; and to drive those without
the right documentation into fraud or flight.
Even greater manipulation of the family took place through the ways the pass laws were
translated by the new rulers of the township - to turn all those who worked in town but
who lacked urban rights into a family-less, homeless working population of single men
and women. To this end, the new regime embarked upon the mass construction of
"hostels". The Nationalists believed, just as Stallard had proclaimed 50 years earlier,
the families of workers in the town were :"non-productive", and could live :"just as wellf
in fact cheaper, in the homelands".79 Of course they excepted those who had been
grudgingly granted "permanent" status. But a new and "ultramodernist" conception of
how the "single" urban worker would be handled was conceptualised and implemented
in a variety of places. This involved the idea that the whole of Alexandra township, for
example, at the time home to the 40,000 people who remained there after the removals
of the 60s, would become a "hostel city". No families would remain: "The whole town
will consist only of such hostels. There will be no houses and also no families".
The plan was to incarcerate "inmates" in prison-like structures:
Each hostel would house 2,500 people but be divided into sections of 100
to 150 people separated by electrically operated steel doors to prevent
unrest spreading and 'for the protection of the inmates themselves1.
Rooms would be provided with a bed, mattress and cupboard, but no
central heating or electricity outlets. Inhabitants would share 112 washing
tubs and 32 electricity points, one bath for every 25 residents, one shower
for every 35, one hand basin and toilet for every 20 and, in the kitchen,
one gas burner for every five people.80
This plan was only partially implemented. Resistance to it was mobilised in the
township in the seventies, slowing and eventually stopping the process of
"hostellisation". Standholders continued to be bought out and more residents removed.
But ten years later only three hostels had been built - one for women and two for men.
They were huge thrusting concrete monuments in the midst of the huddled disorder of
what remained of the township; monuments to a mad form of modernity, in which iron
gates which could be lowered at any moment were indeed built to separate corridors
from one another in case riots erupted; in which communal facilities allowed little dignity
or privacy; and in which the construction of "singleness" was imposed relentlessly upon
all. They epitomise the period of extreme racial modernism, both in their grossness and
in the fact that they represent a plan uncompleted.
What happened to the liberals - the paternalists who had played so central a part in
both the capacity for the governance of the townships, and the development of certain
institutions of social and cultural life? In the new order, these kinds of activities no
longer had the stamp of state approval. Charity, church, welfare and cultural activities
were curbed and made more difficult to undertake through the introduction of harsh
measures; relationships between the shattered black elite and the white liberal elite
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were all but destroyed through stricter enforcement of segregation.81 Missionaries, for
example, were no longer permitted to live in townships. Schools were closed, as we
have seen. Permits to enter the townships became increasingly difficult to obtain. In
1966 the government decreed that no white organisation could have any rights in
Soweto, forcing the City Council to take over (and subsidise) the activities of charities
until it, too, was removed from township life.82
The European welfare worker and health inspector, the European
minister and teacher, the European sports and music organiser, became
rarities in township life where before they had entered personally into the
lives and homes of the people.83
Many liberals redirected themselves away from activities which entailed playing some
part in the networks and relationships within the townships, and towards acting as
intermediaries between the new, far harsher regime itself (at the state level) and the
black population. The Black Sash Advice Office, for example, assisted people in finding
their way through the new bureaucracy and fought for their rights; and Haggie describes
how:
For years, at eight one morning every week, Pam Reid was at the Polly
Street pass office to do battle on behalf of women desperate for work who
did not have the magic 'section 10(1)(a) of the Urban Areas Act1 stamp
in their passes or registration books. The stamp was granted only if the
women complied with a series of stringent requirements, and Pam, who
is a gentle lady, would stand over the clerks, at times coming near to
using physical force to prevent them from applying the hated 'endorsed
out1 stamp - which would have meant no hope for employment every
again in Johannesburg for the luckless pass-holder.84
This was still an intermediate role for liberals - but a very different one from that which
had prevailed under paternalism.
Thus these years consolidated the major shift in the way in which black citizenship was
constructed by the state - a shift that had begun in the 1950s. Legal provisions made
it clearer than ever before to residents that they were in town as a privilege rather than
as a right. Long standing residents of townships had to prove their residency, their
places of birth, and a myriad of other things (all difficult for working class people) before
they were given the status to remain. They became immigrants within their own
country. In addition social and personal life was dislocated, networks were weakened,
the law was corrupted, and dignity was eroded. There was an uncoupling of any, even
modest, concept of citizenship from the actual township itself.
This state of affairs was to change, at least in theory, with the implementation of the
Riekert Commission report of 1979. But although Riekert offered the urban dwellers
acknowledgment of their permanence, it offered nothing comprehensive to replace
paternalism - and still placed the burden of proof of the new "citizenship" upon the
township dweller. Similarly, the rush on the part of reformist Nationalism to recreate a
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township elite in the late 70s and early 80s came too late to look anything but cynical -
and was accompanied by the segregation and removal of the elite to posh areas on the
borders of townships, rather than any serious attempt at the moral, social and cultural
reconstruction of the connections between the elites and their co-residents.
The new order had turned townships into something sociologically different: what had
been societies shaped by class, kin and status, became more clearly racial or ethnic
ones, in which the possibilities for negotiation were minimised by bureaucracy. Their
capacity to find a place in, and remain in town had depended in the early regime upon
blacks1 access networks, resources and culture; now blacks, and only blacks, had the
burden of proof of their citizenship placed upon them; and were subjected to humiliating
and nightmarish procedures for the proof to be acknowledged by the state.
A key result of these many processes was the reconstruction of identity within township
communities along racial lines. As early as the 1960s, white participants in a mixed-
race charity were noting that there had been a
change in race relations during the last two or three years. There
appears to be a definite deterioration in black-white relationships...which
can only be attributed to an increased state of mistrust, uncertainty and
possibly antagonism...83
The ideologies which developed upon the basis of these new identities were not only
strongly racially-conscious, they were also clearly anti-liberal, in sharp contrast to the
earlier tendency towards compatibility between African nationalism and liberalism.
The new order legislated away the moral, economic, cultural and social securities of
welfare paternalism and failed at any point to replace them with a viable alternative.
The peculiar morality of paternalism was gone, and a substitute was not offered by the
Nationalist government itself. The question was, then, what alternative could the forces
for liberation offer?
Conclusion
What does the delineation of these two eras, each with its own distinctive type of racist
governance, tell us about the reasons for and nature of the resistance of the mid-
1980s?.
It assists us to locate the impulses towards resistance in the social and cultural
institutions which constituted these communities, as well as in their overall place in the
wider system. Simple economism won't do, the paper argues. In each era, the creation
and sustaining of townships was surely about accumulation; but it was also about
power, space, authority and class (from the dominant group's point of view) as well as
about meaning, kinship, social stratum and survival (from the point of view of township
inhabitants). The seeds of a culture of resistance may have been planted through the
act of domination. But they did not germinate, grow and flourish outside of the fertile soil
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provided by human interactions within a variety of institutions, all acting with and against
one another over time.
The main argument here has been that the move from welfare paternalism to racial
modernism entailed a loss of citizenship (of a "special type" perhaps), class, status,
cultural security, authority and power, by a range of township based groups - a removal,
in fact, of the resources available to create a certain sort of stability. These things had
all existed in particular configurations under the segregationist/paternalistic order, and
had underpinned its relative stability - blacks were "governable".
Ironically, it suggests, it was the rulers rather than the ruled, who dislodged this working
hegemony. Their reasons for dislodging it may in part have lain in the challenges to
paternalism which were inherent in the mass urbanisation of the 1940s; but this is not
entirely the case. Afrikaner nationalism acted thus for a variety of reasons of its own
as well. The loss of the old order rendered the older generation, as well as the
stabilising elite helpless; they lacked the ideological and other resources to pose any
alternatives to racial modernism.
Eventually new ideologies provided the younger generation with a means to mobilise,
while the crises of rents, schooling and local government provided the opportunities.
The rebellions of the eighties took up immediate and urgent issues of survival for the
poor; but they reflected a pre-existing and long developing vacuum of authority on the
part of their rulers.
The youths' mobilisation did not take the form of a reassertion of paternalism, although
this was present to some extent, (for example, is it perhaps the case that current ideas
of entitlement are a legacy of welfare paternalism - whether or not breastfeeding has
occurred!?) But the revolts of the mid eighties did not generally represent a nostalgic
nationalism, seeking to restore a lost past. Something different emerged - a strongly
millenarian element to their thought and behaviour. In rejecting both paternalism and
liberalism, they also rejected their own parents - upon whom the earlier hierarchy of
control had depended. They sought in fact to "turn the world upside down".
The elements of moral renewal and reconstruction contained in their revolts - a reply
to the vacuum that existed by the eighties - were powerful. They ran campaigns against
crime, drink and litter. They ran peoples' courts in which their own elders were
disciplined for moral transgressions such as wife-beating, abandonment of the family
and alcoholism. But these were often overlaid with a less clearcut set of moral
prescriptions, as well as the unpremeditated acts of violence and destruction that
characterised the frequently mobilised crowds and mobs that emerged. Here
resistance came to take the form of violence turned in on township life and society, and
on the older generation; here, it became revolutionary, anti-modern and often a-moral.
The idea of the peoples' court, for example, on the surface an admirably "alternative"
institution of justice, and one often set up by idealists with a clear desire to replace the
discredited system of law,86 as well as to restore a moral sense to the township, is at
heart dangerously invasive of the moral order, placing responsibility for judging life and
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death, right and wrong, outside of the realm of accountable institutions.87 There are
overlaps between this sort of moral certainty and that which appears in cases of the
mob necklacing suspected "impimpis".
The destruction of local government through the hounding and persecution of those still
prepared to stand for local councils was almost complete in the mid eighties. Alternative
attempts at self-government and at youth control of life in townships were made, with
varying degrees of success - a clear response to, and acceleration of, the failure of the
state to find an alternative to paternalism.
There was also a "turning in" on township life, which took a vigorously spatial and
symbolic form.88 The revolts imprinted themselves upon the environment, both using
it and rejecting it. Yards, blocks, streets on the one hand; hostels on the other, became
the organising motifs of the revolt in Alexandra, for example. Militant youth groups were
identified spatially (the 7th avenue group, the 12th Avenue group) in an exaggerated
and politicised version of the kind of gang behaviour found in many working class
"slums".89 Mobilisation was located around core areas (the stadium, the cemetery);
events and institutions were remembered and marked by their location.
These features of the mid-eighties revolt were not, thus, a simple response to
oppression and exploitation. They were born of the changing modes of governance
and non-governance, of cultural and political configurations, of ideological and social
meanings, in the townships over this century. It was not the ANC that had rendered the
townships ungovernable. It was the NP. The ANC seized upon the situation and used
it to the advantage of its own programme for liberation.
But it has now inherited the problem of running the townships itself. It is left with the
task of restoring governability to places in which it has been eroded over a period of
forty years - raising the question of whether the townships are in fact permanently
ungovernable.
Many townships today are intractable and violence-ridden ghettoes, in which ordinary
people make their lives, but in which powerful forces continue to create ungovernability
where the political call for ungovernability no longer exists. Here the lethal cultural
cocktail of youth militancy, sub- subsistence wages, unemployment, a habit of
boycotting, high levels of "acceptable" violence, endemic crime and, now, easily
available hard drugs threatens to shape the new order in destructive ways. Yet the
everyday discourses of policy makers reveal little of the complexities underlying
present-day township life and culture. The ANC, for example, wishes to tackle the
"causes of crime";90 but they usually operate from the basis of economic determinism,
assuming, for example, that the causes of crime are mainly to be found in shortages of
homes and jobs. Perhaps this paper will go some way towards enriching our, and their,
explanations and, therefore assisting us to find solutions.
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